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No. 20060364-CA 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 




JERRY D. OLDS, Utah State Engineer, UTAH DEPARTMENT OF 
NATURAL RESOURCES, and TERRY MONROE, 
Defendants/Appellees, 
BRIEF OF APPELLEES 
Defendants-Appellees Jerry D. Olds, Utah Department of Natural 
Resources, and Terry Monroe submit this brief in answer to the brief of 
Appellants William J. Tuttle, Charlene W. Tuttle, Kenton Tuttle and 
Lori M. Tuttle. 
ISSUES PRESENTED 
1. Untimely notice of claim 
The Tuttles sold their farms at an inflated value allegedly because the 
defendants negligently failed to discover during a groundwater survey that 
the Tuttles were illegally irrigating their farms. Did the one year period for 
filing notice of their negligence claim begin to run when the Tuttles first 
became aware that the survey was wrong, or later, when they were held 
liable to the sellers for fraud? 
A. Standard of review 
Failure to comply with the notice of claim requirement of the Utah 
Governmental Immunity Act deprives the court of subject matter jurisdiction. 
Cedar Prof I Plaza, L.C. v. Cedar City Corp., 2006 UT App. 36, f 7,131 P.3d 
275, 278. Whether a trial court has subject matter jurisdiction presents a 
question of law that this Court reviews under a correction of error standard 
without deference to the trial court. See, e.g., Case v. Case, 2004 UT App. 
423,1 5,103 P.3d 171. 
B. Preservation of issue 
The question of subject matter jurisdiction is a threshold issue that may 
be raised at any time. State v. Sun Surety Ins. Co., 2004 UT 74, f 7, 99 P.3d 
818, 820. Nevertheless, the defendants did raise this issue in their motion to 
-2-
dismiss, R.60-62, and the trial court granted judgment on the pleadings on 
this issue. See Order Granting Defendants' Motion for Judgment on the 
Pleadings. R. 194-96; Addendum A.1 
2. Waiver of procedural error 
In their opening brief, the Tuttles failed to specify or provide any analysis 
concerning the "many matters" outside the pleadings that they claim the trial 
court improperly relied upon, or the allegations they contend the trial court 
failed to construe in their favor. Have the Tuttles waived these claims of 
procedural error? 
A Standard of review 
This issue is unique to the appeal and is properly raised for the first time 
in this brief. 
B. Preservation of issue 
This issue is unique to the appeal and is properly raised for the first time 
in this brief. 
\A copy of the Order is included in the addendum to this brief because 
the Tuttles failed to attach one as required by Rule 24(a)(ll)(c) of the Utah 
Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
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3. No duty 
The state engineer conducted a groundwater survey of the Pahvant Valley 
to address a concern about significant overdraft of water, some of which was 
caused by the irrigation of farmland not covered by valid water rights. In 
conducting the survey, did the engineer owe a duty to the Turtles to exercise 
reasonable care to discover their illegal watering? 
A Standard of review 
Whether a duty exists is a question of law. See, e.g., Webb v. University of 
Utah, 2005 UT 80,1 9,125 P.3d 906, 909; Weber v. SpHngville City, 725 P.2d 
1360,1363 (Utah 1986). When reviewing a dismissal under Rule 12(b) or 
12(c), this Court should accept all factual allegations in the complaint as true 
and interpret those facts and all reasonable inferences therefrom in the light 
most favorable to the plaintiff as the nonmoving party. See Russell Packard 
Dev., Inc. v. Varson,2005 UT 14, f 3,108 P.3d 741, 743; Miller v. 
Gastronomy, Inc., 2005 UT App. 80, f 6,110 P.3d 144,146. 
B. Preservation of issue 
This issue was raised at the hearing on the defendants' Rule 12(bX6) 
motion to dismiss. R. 208 at 16-17,19-21, 55-60. The trial court granted 
judgment on the pleadings on this issue. See Order Granting Defendants' 
Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings. R. 194-96; Addendum A. 
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4. No estoppel 
Following steps to prevent farmers in the Pahvant Valley from irrigating 
without valid water rights, the Division of Water Rights sent farmers a letter 
expressing the state engineer's opinion that all irrigated land was now 
covered by a valid water right. Later, the Division discovered that additional 
farmland was being irrigated without a water right, exposing the fact that 
the Tuttles had recently sold their farms at an inflated price based on their 
representations to the sellers that the water rights were sufficient to irrigate 
the entire farmland. May the Tuttles assert a claim for equitable estoppel 
against the Division? 
A Standard of review 
The dismissal of a claim for equitable estoppel should be reviewed for 
correctness, without deference to the decision below. See Holland v. CSRB, 
856 P.2d 678, 682 (Utah 1993); Prows v. State, 822 P.2d 764, 768-69 (1991). 
When reviewing the propriety of dismissal under Rule 12(b) or 12(c), this 
Court should accept all factual allegations in the complaint as true and 
interpret those facts and all reasonable inferences therefrom in the light 
most favorable to the plaintiff as the nonmoving party. See Russell Packard 
Dev., Inc. v. Carson, 2005 UT 14, f 3,108 P.3d 741, 743; Miller v. 
Gastronomy, Inc., 2005 UT App. 80, \ 6,110 P.3d 144,146. 
-5-
B. Preservation of issue 
This issue was raised in the defendants' motion to dismiss. R. 180-81. The 
trial court granted the motion as one for judgment on the pleadings, without 
specifically addressing the estoppel claim. See Order Granting Defendants' 
Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings. R. 194-96; Addendum A. 
5. No takings violation 
Following steps to prevent farmers in the Pahvant Valley from irrigating 
without valid water rights, the Division of Water Rights sent farmers a letter 
expressing the state engineer's opinion that all irrigated land was now 
covered by a valid water right. Later, the Division discovered that additional 
farmland was being irrigated without a water right. Did the Division's action 
to prevent continued illegal irrigation of the farmland constitute a violation 
of the Utah takings clause? 
A. Standard of review 
The interpretation and application of the Utah takings clause present 
questions of law, which should be reviewed for correctness. See View Condo. 
Owners Ass'n v. MSICO, L.L.C., 2005 UT 91, M 29-30,127 P.3d 697, 704-05; 
Strawberry Elec. Serv. Dist. v. Spanish Fork City, 918 P.2d 870, 876 (Utah 
1996). 
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B. Preservation of issue 
This issue was raised in the defendants' motion to dismiss. R.68-69. The 
trial court granted the motion as one for judgment on the pleadings, without 
specifically addressing the takings claim. See Order Granting Defendants' 
Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings. R. 194-96; Addendum A. 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL 
PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
The following provisions are central to the issues on appeal and are 
included in Addendum B to this Brief. 
Rule 10(c), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
Rule 12(c), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
Rule 24(a)(9), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure 
Utah Code Ann. § 73-2-1 (West 2004) 
Utah Code Ann. § 73-2-15 (West 2004) 
Utah Code Ann. § 73-2-17 (West 2004) 
Utah Code Ann. § 73-5-9 (West 2004) 
Utah Code Ann. § 73-3-17 (West 2004) 
Utah Code Ann. § 73-4-l(a) (West 2004) 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
This action arose from the Tuttles' sale of farmland in Millard County, 
Utah, to Arizona residents Grant and Fern Ellsworth. After the sale, the 
Ellsworths learned that, contrary to the Tuttles' representations, the water 
rights appurtenant to the farms were insufficient to water a substantial part 
of the farm acreage. The Ellsworths sued the Tuttles in federal court and won 
a judgment against them for about $ 1.4 million based on fraud, breach of 
warranty, wrongful conversion, breach of contract, punitive damages, 
attorney fees and costs. 
The Tuttles then brought this action against the state engineer,2 alleging 
that when he conducted a groundwater survey in the mid-1990s, he 
negligently failed to discover that they were illegally irrigating a substantial 
portion of their farms. About a year before the Tuttles sold their farms, the 
Division of Water Rights3 informed them that it could not identify any water 
right for a large irrigation well on one of the farms. Nevertheless, the Tuttles 
allege that they relied on the groundwater survey when they sold the farms 
2State Engineer Olds is sued in his official capacity only because the 
events on which the Tuttles base their claims occurred before Olds took the 
position. 
3The Division of Water Rights is part of the Department of Natural 
Resources. 
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to the Ellsworths. The Tuttles further claim that when the Division refused 
to allow the Ellsworths to continue to irrigate land not covered by a valid 
water certificate, it took the Tuttles* property without due process of law. The 
Tuttles assert claims in negligence, estoppel, and violation of the takings 
clause of the Utah Constitution. 
The trial court dismissed the Tuttles' claims on two grounds: first, the 
court held that, as the landowners, the Tuttles were charged with knowing 
the water rights appurtenant to their land and that the state engineer owed 
no duty to the Tuttles to use reasonable care to discover their illegal 
watering. Second, the trial court held that the Tuttles' claims were barred 
because they had failed to file a timely notice of claim as required by the 
Utah Governmental Immunity Act. Defendants urge this Court to affirm the 
decision below. 
Course of the Proceedings and Disposition Below 
On July 28, 2005, the Tuttles commenced this action by filing their 
Complaint. R. 1-33. The defendants filed a motion to dismiss in lieu of an 
answer. R. 48-50. The motion was fully briefed, R. 51-125,131-74, & 175-83, 
and the parties presented oral argument. R. 193, 208. At the hearing, the 
trial court granted the motion under Rule 12(c), as a judgment on the 
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pleadings. On March 31, 2006, the trial court entered an Order Granting 
Defendants' Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings. R. 194-96; Addendum A. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
The following facts are taken from the allegations in the Complaint and, 
pursuant to Rule 10(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, from record facts 
established by documents that were either attached to the Complaint or that 
are central to the allegations. 
In 1994, in response to evidence of a significant overdraft of water in the 
Pahvant Valley in Millard County, Utah, the Utah Division of Water Rights 
proposed a groundwater management plan for the area. R.20-24. The 
Division estimated the annual recharge to the groundwater system to be 
65,000 acre-feet, while the annual discharge was 100,000 acre-feet—a loss of 
35,000 acre-feet each year. Id. at 20. About 80 per cent of the discharge was 
from irrigation wells and, of 36,000 total acres of farmland, about 8,800 were 
being irrigated without a valid or properly recorded water right. Id. The 
proposed plan stated, "this issue is very serious and will be addressed first to 
see if, by eliminating the illegal acreage, the well withdrawals can be 
reduced." Id. Therefore, "the initial phase [of the plan] deals with elimination 
of any irrigated acreage which does not have a water right and controlling 
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wasting wells." R.2L 
To implement the plan, the Division surveyed the irrigated acreage of the 
Pahvant Valley, where the Tuttles owned two farms. i f WO.4 Aware that 
some of their neighbors had received warning letters regarding illegal 
irrigation, the Tuttles "became anxious about whether their water usage 
would be deemed impropei the Division's 
regional office in Richfield, Utah and inquired whether they were in violation. 
Unidentified employees of the regional office told the Tuttles that if they had 
not cause for concern." Id. at f H56-
59. The employees also showed the Tuttles a map of the Pahvant Valley with 
the areas of suspected violations shaded red. The Tuttles' farms were 
shaded red. R.9-10 at 1160-62. 
In March 1996, then state engineer Robert Morgan sent a letter to water 
users in Pahvant Valley, including the Tuttles 
of the groundwater management plan. Among other things, Morgan reported 
that a[d]uring the spring of 1994, the acreage survey was completed and all 
water mmn: ,|i|»11 " < igatiiij,1' ' " 'I without a water right were notified. As.' 
a result of this effort and with the cooperation of water users, all irrigated 
lands are now covered by valid water rights." R.25; Appellants , 
4William and Charlotte Tuttle owned a farm consisting of over 1,000 
acres. R. 2 at f 8. Their son Kenton and his wife Lori owned a smaller farm of 
about 640 acres. R. 2 at f 9. Both farms included substantial acreage not 
covered by a certificate of beneficial use. R. 134 at I f 17-18. 
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Addendum A. 
During this time, the Tuttles had been irrigating their entire farmland of 
about 1,700 acres, but held valid water rights for only 935.2 acres. R.12 at 
H89; R. 13 at ff 98-99; R.134 at M18-19.5 The groundwater survey, however, 
did not discover the shortage and therefore the Tuttles did not receive 
notification of their illegal irrigation. R.9 at f 51. In 1998, however, Assistant 
Regional Engineer Terry L. Monroe sent a letter to William J. Tuttle 
notifying him that Monroe had been unable to identify any water right 
associated with a "large irrigation well" equipped with a diesel motor ("the 
Diesel Well") located on Turtle's farm and requesting assistance in locating a 
water right for the well. R.27. 
The Tuttles received Monroe's letter while they were in negotiations to 
sell their farms, including their water rights, to the Ellsworths. R.10 at 170 
& R.27. When the Ellsworths inquired about water rights, the Tuttles gave 
them documentation of their water rights and the 1996 letter from Morgan. 
Id. at M68-69. The sale of the farm and water rights closed on July 1,1999. 
R.11 at M76-77. 
Several months after the sale, Monroe sent the Ellsworths a letter about 
5At hearing below, the Tuttles refused to concede that a substantial 
portion of their farms was not covered by water rights. R. 208 at 29-30. That 
refusal contradicted their own allegations. R. 12 at f 89; R 13 at ff 98-99; R. 
134 at ff 18-19. More importantly, a substantial shortage in water rights is a 
necessary premise of their claim that the defendants negligently conducted 
the survey. 
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concerns he had with water rights on the farms. R.11 at f 78 & R.28-30. In 
the letter, Monroe stated that the Diesel Well was an improper point of 
diversion and analyzed the various water rights associated with the farms, 
concluding that rights existed for the sole supply of only 861.10 of 1700 acres. 
R.28-30. Monroe informed the Ellsworths that ' 11 I I  1111 \M 11 • I,' 11 Il 11 m a t t h e s e 
issues be resolved before the upcoming irrigation season as this ofifice will not 
allow the continued use of a well with no water rights in it and the continued 
irrigation of land 
The Ellsworths filed suit against the Tuttles in November 2001. R.12 at 
f 85. A jury verdict against the Tuttles was rendered on April 30, 2003, and a 
judgmt ately $ i illion. Id. at f 92.6 The Tuttles 
filed a notice of claim against State Engineer Jerry D. Olds and the 
Department of Natural Resources on about April 28, 2004. R. 113-20. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
'liniiit 111 I iiii I DiTiril.s1 ilisimiswil the Tuttles'negligence claims against 
the defendants because the Tuttles failed to file a notice of claim within a 
year of when the claims arose as required by the Utah Governmental 
•
bThe judgment was afliini<nl DM .'ippts'il i Ellsworth i ",.i ,}ui ,i"". .", 148 Fed. 
Appx. 653 (10th Cir. 2005). 
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Immunity Act. At the latest, the claims arose in November 2001, when the 
Ellsworths filed suit against the Tuttles in federal court. The Tuttles' notice 
of claim was not filed until April 2004. 
The Tuttles have waived on appeal any error resulting from the trial 
courts' alleged reliance on materials outside the pleadings by failing to 
explain their argument in their opening brief with enough specificity to 
enable defendants to respond. The only outside matters to which the Tuttles 
refer is "the basis for the jury's decision in the federal action" and the 
"decisions made in the federal courts." But the Tuttles themselves relied on 
pleadings from the federal action in opposing the defendants' motion to 
dismiss. Moreover, public records from the federal case were central to the 
allegations and could have properly been considered under Rule 10(c) of the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. In addition, although both parties offered 
outside materials and the trial court asked questions about the federal case, 
the court did not rely on and therefore implicitly excluded outside materials 
in making its decision. 
Even if the Tuttles had timely filed notice of their negligence claims, those 
claims were also correctly dismissed because the state engineer owed the 
Tuttles no duty to use reasonable care in conducting a groundwater survey 
whose express purpose was to eliminate illegal irrigation, not to determine or 
alter water rights. In addition, the Tuttles' allegations fail to establish 
-14-
several necessary elements of an estoppel claim against a governmental 
€ ^y set of facts that could be proven in 
support of their claim, demonstrate that defendants made a specific written 
representation that the Tuttles had sufficient water rights to irrigate their 
enure farm m ii'ii^1, MMI tln»y reasonably relied on the statements that were 
made, that manifest injustice would result if estoppel were not applied and 
that the application of estoppel would not impair the exercise of the 
governmental function of administering water rights. 
Finally, the district court correctly dismissed the Tuttles* taking claim 
because the Tuttles "ghts to 
irrigate their entire farmland. Nor did the Division ever "take" property that 
was never the Tuttles' to begin with. Therefore, this Court should affirm the 
judgm* 
ARGUMENT 
1. The Notice of Claim Was Untimely 
The trial court correctly held that the Tuttles* notice of claim was 
untimely because it was filed more than one year after their claims accrued. 
The Utah Governmental Immunity Act (the "Act") provides that "a claim 
against the state, or against its employee for an act or omission occurring 
during the performance of the employee's duties, within the scope of 
employment, or under color of authority, is barred unless notice of claim is 
filed with the attorney general within one year after the claim arises . . . " 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-12 (West 2004).7 The Act further provides that "[a] 
claim arises when the statute of limitations that would apply if the claim 
were against a private person begins to run." Id. at 63-30-11(1).8 
Generally, "a statute of limitations is triggered upon the happening of the 
last event necessary to complete the cause of action." Cedar Prof I Plaza v. 
Cedar City Corp., 2006 UT App. 36, f 11,131 P.3d 275, 279 (citation and 
7The Utah Governmental Immunity Act was repealed as of July 1, 
2004 and replaced by the Governmental Immunity Act of Utah. The 
corresponding provision in the new act imposes the same time limitation as 
the previous provision, but alters the place of filing. See Utah Code Ann. 
§ 63-30d-402 (West 2004) (effective July 1, 2004). 
8The corresponding provision in the new act sets forth a new exception 
that codifies a discovery rule. See Section 63-30d-401(l)(a)-(c). 
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internal quotation marks omitted) (construing parallel notice requirement for 
claims against political subdivisions). However, a plaintiff is "not entitled to 
wait until it [knows] **ting [the claim against the 
defendant]. It is enough that [the plaintiff is] 'aware that the governmental 
entity's action or inaction ha[s] resulted in some kind of harm to [the 
plaintiffs] i 11 ti n . *1.. w I " I "1 1 1 "I i i 1 111, Bank One Utah v. West Jordan 
City, 2002 UT App 271,112, 54 R3d 135). 
The Tuttles were certainly aware that the allegedly negligent survey had 
n • s 11 II ill n i in i in , HI i mi in in i II i in in in in I I il  i in il Interests- by the lime the Ellsworths filed their 
complaint against the Tuttles in federal court, in November 2001. In fact, the 
Tuttles had reason to doubt the survey long before then. 
c I t, landowners are presumed to know the extent of their water rights. 
Dugan v. Jones, 615 P.2d 1239,1246 (Utah 1980), superseded by statute on 
procedural grounds as note 1307 (U 
In addition, the Tuttles' own allegations establish that they had doubts that 
prompted them to inquire at the Division's regional office in Richfield. R.9 at 
Iff f '*«"- " • I -** ! nidentified employees at the 
regional office resolved those doubts, the Tuttles apparently ignored their 
actual water certificates. 
Moreover, * 998 letter from Terry Monroe questioning the existence of a 
water right for the Diesel Well should have revived the Tuttles' concerns 
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before they sold their farms. The Tuttles had at least inquiry notice, if not 
outright personal knowledge, that the survey was inaccurate even before the 
sale of their farms. See, e.g., Maoris v. Sculptured Software, Inc., 2001UT 43, 
M 26-27, 24 P.3d 984, 991-92 (holding shareholder of closely held corporation 
was on inquiry notice of claim for conversion of shares when she was denied 
access to company information); Walker Drug Co., Inc. v. La Sal Oil Co., 902 
P.2d 1229,1231 (Utah 1995) (holding plaintiff was on inquiry notice of 
property damage when they became aware of governmental investigation of 
potential environmental contamination of neighboring property). Accordingly, 
the trial court correctly concluded that the April 2004 notice of claim was 
untimely.9 
The Tuttles' attempt to challenge that conclusion by relying on Valley 
Colour, Inc. v. Beuchert Bldgs., Inc., 944 P.2d 361 (Utah 1997), is misplaced. 
That^as^inv^v^^Iaiins^for slander of title and tortious inference by the 
filing of a mechanic's lien against the plaintiffs property. The Supreme Coxirt 
held that because special damages were a necessary element of those claims, 
the claims did not accrue and the limitations period did not begin to run until 
9The Tuttles argued below that water rights are too complex for them 
to understand without expert assistance. But this did not relieve them of the 
obligation to exercise due diligence under the circumstances. See, e.g., Walker 
Drug, 902 P.2d at 1229 (holding property owners were on inquiry notice of 
possible environmental contamination of their property because they could 
have hired an expert to investigate the cause of gas fumes in and around 
their property). 
-18-
the property was sold and the damages became ascertainable. Id. 
But proof of special damages is not a required element of the Tuttles' 
negligence claim. Tlin IIHIII I Hi ii special ihiii.tf't's. rule applied in Valley Colour 
is inapposite. Rather, the Tuttles sustained harm as soon as they became 
aware that the survey was inaccurate because that is when they allegedly 
sustained a dinu* * their farms. That alleged diminution 
occurred even regardless of whether they ever sold their property. Thus, there 
is nothing about the federal damage award that was essential to the 
C l.i,» I H I , ! 1 ' , I l l ( i l i S I i l l 1 1 ' I I ! . . ' ' ' ' • • • • • ' • • • " 
Again, the Tuttles were placed upon inquiry notice of the defendants' 
alleged negligence no later than when the . a 
November 2001. But the Tuttles did not file their notice of claim for 
approximately two and a half more years, in April 2004. Therefore, the trial 
< * " i t correctly detei. • • foiled to file their notice of the ; 
negligence claims within one year of when the claims arose. Accordingly, this 
Court should affirm the dismissal of the Tuttles' negligence claims.10 
10The parties agree that no notice of claim was required for the Tuttles' 
equitable estoppel and takings claims, which are discussed at Points 4 and 5 
below. 
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2. The Tuttles Have Waived Any Procedural Challenge to the 
Decision Below by Failing to Adequately Develop Their 
Argument in Their Opening Brief 
The Tuttles have waived any procedural challenge to the decision below by 
failing to adequately develop their argument in their opening brief. Rule 
24(a)(9) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure provides that the argument 
"shall contain the contentions and reasons of the appellant with respect to the 
issues presented . . . with citations to the authorities, statutes, and parts of 
the record relied on." U. R. App. P. 24(a)(9). In applying this rule, the 
Supreme Court has declined to review issues not presented with sufficient 
clarity, stating that "a reviewing court is entitled to have the issues clearly 
defined with pertinent authority cited and is not simply a repository in which 
the appealing party may dump the burden of argument and research." See 
State v. Thomas, 1999 UT 2, f 11, 974 P.2d 269, 271. 
In this vein, both the Supreme Court and this Court have frequently 
rejected arguments simply on the ground that they were insufficiently 
developed in the appellant's opening brief. See, e.g., Jensen v. Sawyers, 2005 
UT 81, ff 133-34,130 P.3d 325, 349-50 (declining to review challenge to 
denial of attorney fees and costs, when appellant argued only that "If the 
court closely examines [the attorney's submissions below], it will see the 
criteria for fees was met."); MiVida Enter, v. Steen-Adams, 2005 UT App. 400, 
f 15 n.4,122 P.3d 144,148 (declining to review contentions that various 
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transactions were final step necessary to complete cause of action when 
appellant "failed to detail the connection" between the transactions and the 
claims). 
The Tuttles' vague assertions that the trial court "considered many 
matters which were outside the pleadings" and "did not construe the 
' allegations in the light most favorab il i mi in In ii.h .,' vv in h out further 
analysis, is insufficient to raise an issue for appeal. See Appellants' Br. at 12. 
Nor are the Tuttles' contentions that "the trial court considered . . . the basis 
: nd "relied in large part on 
the decisions made in the federal courts," id., specific enough to satisfy the 
Tuttles* burden of presenting the issue with sufficient clarity that the 
dHWi(l/»niu in I HI i "(" mil would not have to guess exactly which decisions in 
the federal action the Tuttles contend that the trial court erroneously relied 
upon. This is especially true where, in opposition 
Tuttles themselves alleged that the federal judgment was based on "fraud, 
breach of warranty, wrongful conversion, breach of contract, and . . . punitive 
damages based 153-54, and that "the jury 
found in favor of the Ellsworths" after Terry Monroe testified that "the 
[Tuttles'] water rights were sufficient to irrigate only 935.2 acres of the 
ii|p|ij\)xirvi4ilj'li 1,700 fimiTes the Ellsworths had purchased from the Tuttles." 
R.12 at 189-90 & R.134 at 1118-20. 
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Even if the Tuttles had not presented such allegations, records from the 
federal case could have properly been considered under Rule 10(c) of the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure, which provides that "an exhibit to a pleading is a 
part thereof for all purposes." U. R. Civ. P. 10(c). Under Rule 10(c), a 
document that is central to the plaintiffs claims may be considered on a 
motion to dismiss even if the plaintiff did not attach the document to the 
complaint. See Oakwood Vill. LLC u. Albertsons, Inc., 2004 UT 101, II10-15, 
104 P.3d 1226,1230-32 (citing federal cases and discussing rule). In addition, 
although at the hearing the trial court queried counsel about the federal case, 
it implicitly excluded any outside materials in making its decision. See id. at 
1231-32 (citing with approval Lybrook v. Farmington Mun. Sch. Bd. ofEduc, 
232 F.3d 1334,1342 (10th Cir. 2000) (finding that trial court implicitly 
excluded outside materials unless it could be established that the trial court 
relied on those materials to reach Its decision, and stating *[T]he submission 
of documents outside the pleadings by itself is not a basis for conversion to 
summary judgment.")). Neither the written order dismissing the Tuttles' 
claims, R. 194-96 (copy attached as Addendum A to this brief), nor the trial 
court's oral ruling at the conclusion of the hearing, R.208 at 60-65, referred to 
any determinations made in the federal case. Rather, the trial court simply 
held that the state engineer owed no duty to the Tuttles to conduct the 
groundwater survey with reasonable care. 
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Alth the Tuttles cite case law on the standard of review for motions to 
dismiss and motions for judgment on the pleadings, they fail to supply any 
analysis or record citations to support their claim of procedural erroi 
s ^ntext of this case, it is far from obvious that the trial 
court improperly relied on any outside material in reaching its decision, or if it 
did, how the trial court's ultimate decision was based MI Mini iiinl-ciiiil Thr 
Tuttles 11 I r not wait until their reply brief to clarify their argument, leaving 
defendants no opportunity to respond. Accordingly, this Court should reject 
the Tuttles' claim of procedui. r~ 
3. The State Engineer Owed No Duty to the Tuttles to Detect their 
Illegal Irrigation 
The trial court also correctly dismissed the Tuttles' negligence claims on 
the alternative ground that the defendants owed no duty to the Tuttles to use 
rtjiiisoiialilii1 vwv " in 11 ill ilmicting the groundwater survey so as to correctly • 
determine their water rights. As the Tuttles correctly assert, under certain 
circumstances not present in this case, the state engineer may seek t (i m in m 1  mi luil 
llfFhe Tuttles also claim that the Court's conversion of the matter to a 
judgment on the pleadings under Rule 12(c) was error. Although defendants 
believe that conversion was not necessary, they are unable to discern how the 
conversion made any difference to the outcome. As the Tuttles note, the 
standards for deciding Rule 12(b)(6) and Rule 12(c) motions are the same. 
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determination of water rights. See Utah Code Ann. § 73-4-l(a) (West 2004). 
But, the state engineer has no statutory authority to adjudicate water rights. 
See Utah Code Ann. §§ 73-3-1 to -29 (West 2004); Searle v. Milburn Irrig. Co., 
2006 UT 16, f 34,133 P.3d 382, 391 ("It is well established that the state 
engineer has no authority to finally adjudicate water rights."); Whitmore u. 
Murray City, 107 Utah 445,154 P.2d 748, 750 (1944) ("The office of state 
engineer was not created to adjudicate vested water rights between parties, 
but to administer and supervise the appropriation of the waters of the state."). 
Thus, only a court—not the state engineer—may finally determine water 
rights. 
Absent a court order, recorded certificates of beneficial use issued by the 
state engineer at the conclusion of extensive administrative proceedings are 
prima facie evidence of water rights. See Utah Code Ann. §§ 73-3-17 (West 
2004) (The certificate so issued and filed shall be prima facie evidence of the 
owner's right to the use of the water in the quantity, for the purpose, at the 
place, and during the time specified therein, subject to prior rights); Lake 
Shore Duck Club v. Lake View Duck Club, 50 Utah 76,166 P. 309, 311 (1917) 
("The certificate is [the water appropriator's] deed; his evidence of title, good, 
at least against the state, for all it purports to be, and good as against every 
one else who cannot show a superior right."). In the face of these formal 
procedures for the determination and recognition of water rights, the Tuttles' 
-24-
claim that the state engineer owed them a duty of reasonable care to 
determine their water rights in conducting a groundwater survey is 
untenable. 
Finding no statutory duty, the Tuttles make the unsupported assertion 
that the state engineer nevertheless undertook to determine their water 
rights in conducting the groundwater survey, and therefore had a duty to use 
reasonable care in doing so. The fundamental flaw in this theory is the 
absence of any alleged facts demonstrating that the state engineer undertook 
such a determination. When imposing a duty to use reasonable care based 
upon an undertaking to render services, courts "must narrowly construe the 
scope of any assumed duty." See Weber v. Springville City, 725 P.2d 1360, 
1364-65 (Utah 1986) (declining to find that by maintaining creek's streambed 
or shoreline to protect against flooding, city assumed a duty to prevent 
children or adults from drowning in the stream). As expressly stated in the 
proposed groundwater management plan, the state engineer undertook to 
eliminate illegal watering so as to reduce or eliminate the overdraft of water 
in the Pahvant Valley. 
Furthermore, the engineer undertook the groundwater survey to protect 
the public interest, not that of the Tuttles. See Utah Code Ann. § 73-1-1 (West 
2004) ("All waters in this state, whether above or under the ground are hereby 
declared to the property of the public, subject to all existing rights to the use 
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thereof."). Therefore, the allegation that the engineer missed the Tuttles' 
illegal irrigation cannot be a basis for liability to the Tuttles absent the 
existence of a special relationship, which the Tuttles do not allege and could 
not demonstrate in this case. See Webb v. University of Utah, 2005 UT 80, f 11 
(recognizing and applying special duty rule, stating "[o]ur search for sound 
public policy has led us . . . to decide that governmental actors should be 
answerable in tort only when their negligent conduct causes injury to persons 
who stand so far apart from the general public that we can describe them as 
having a special relationship to the governmental actor.") 
Neither of the cases cited by the Tuttles is to the contrary. In Nelson v. 
Salt Lake City, 919 P.2d 568 (Utah 1996), there was no question that the 
government had undertaken to fence the park adjacent to the river that the 
child fell into. Id. at 570. Moreover, liability for voluntarily assumed duties is 
generally limited to damages for physical harm. See Restatement (Second) of 
Torts § 365 (1965); 57A Am. Jur. 2d Negligence § 105 (Westlaw updated May 
2006). The case of DCR Inc. v. Peak Alarm Co., 663 P.2d 433 (Utah 1983) is 
even further afield. There, liability was not based upon any undertaking by 
the defendant alarm company to warn its customers that the alarm system 
could be easily disabled by burglars. Rather, the Court held that a contractual 
relationship between the parties created a special relationship that created a 
duty of due care that extended beyond the obligations undertaken in the 
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contract. Id. at 434-37. Moreover, DCR Inc. involved the duty of one private 
entity to another, not the duty of a governmental entity to an individual. See 
We&6,2005UT80,atflll. 
The ultimate point of the Tuttles' contention that the state engineer had no 
authority to conduct a groundwater survey is unclear, but in any event, 
incorrect. The survey fell within the state engineer's responsibility "for the 
general administrative supervision of the waters of the state and the 
measurement, appropriation, apportionment, and distribution of those 
waters," Utah Code Ann. § 73-2-l(3)(a) (West 2004); his authority to "secure 
the equitable apportionment and distribution of the water according to the 
respective rights of appropriators, id. at § 73-2-l(3)(b)(ii); his authority to sue 
to "enjoin the unlawful appropriation, diversion, and use of surface and 
underground water"12 and to "prevent waste, loss, or pollution of those 
waters," id^at § 73-2-l(3)(b)(iii)(A) & (B); and his authority to require repairs 
or construction to "prevent waste, loss, pollution or contamination of any 
waters." Id. at § 73-5-9. In addition, the authority to conduct groundwater 
surveys is presumed in authorizing the state engineer "for and on behalf of the 
state of Utah, with the approval of the executive director of natural resources 
12See also Rocky Ford Irrig. Co. v. Rents Lake Reservoir Co., 140 P.2d 
638, 639 (Utah 1943) (citing predecessor statute and stating, "It thus appears 
that there are adequate procedures under which the state engineer can 
compel the appropriator to comply with the law governing the diversion and 
the use of water storage rights."). 
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and the governor,... to enter into agreements with any federal or state 
agency, subdivision or institution for cooperation in making snow surveys and 
investigations of both underground and surface water resources of the state." 
Id. at § 73-2-15. See also id. at § 73-2-17 ("The state engineer, for and on 
behalf of the state of Utah, with the approval of the executive director and the 
governor, is authorized and directed to enter into an agreement with the 
United States geological survey or any other federal or state agency, for 
cooperation in making investigations of the groundwater resources of the state 
and reporting thereon."). 
Thus, the trial court correctly ruled that the state engineer owed no duty to 
the Tuttles to use reasonable care to conduct the groundwater survey of the 
Pahvant Valley so as to discover the Tuttles' illegal watering. This Court 
therefore should affirm the dismissal of the Tuttles* negligence claim. 
4. The Tuttles' Allegations Do Not Satisfy the Heightened 
Requirements for Estoppel Against the Government 
The Tuttles' attempt to invoke equitable estoppel against the defendants 
fails for several reasons: the Tuttles' allegations fail to show, first, that the 
defendants made specific written representations that the Tuttles' water 
rights "were sufficient to irrigate their farms"; second, that the Tuttles 
reasonably relied upon the representations; third, that manifest injustice 
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would result if estoppel were not applied; and fourth, that the exercise of 
governmental powers would not be impaired if estoppel were applied. 
This Court has recognized that "as a general rule, estoppel may not be 
invoked against a governmental entity." View Condo. Owners Ass'n u. MSICO, 
L.L.C., 2004 UT App. 104, f 34 n.2, 90 P.3d 1042,1051 n.2 (alterations and 
quotation marks omitted), rev'd on other grounds, 2005 UT 91,127 P.3d 697. 
But, "in Utah, there is a limited exception to this general principle for unusual 
circumstances where it is plain that the interests of justice so require." Id. 
(quotation and citation omitted). For the unusual circumstances exception to 
apply, the plaintiff must show that "authorized government entities" have 
made "very specific written representations." Id. 
The Tuttles allege that oral representations were made to them by 
unidentified employees of the Division's regional office in Richfield that if the 
Tuttles had not received^motice that they were in violation and their land did 
not appear on the color code maps, they had "no cause for concern." R.9 at f 
59. These representations were nothing more than assurances that at that 
time the Division did not consider the Tuttles to be illegally irrigating, not a 
specific representation that they had valid water rights sufficient to enable 
them to irrigate a certain acreage. But in any event, the representations were 
oral and therefore cannot form the basis of an estoppel claim against 
defendants. See, e.g., Thimmes v. Utah State Univ., 2001 UT App. 93, f 8, 22 
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P.3d 257, 259 (affirming dismissal of pedestrian's personal injury claim 
against university, holding university not estopped from asserting that 
pedestrian failed to comply with notice of claim requirement before filing 
personal injury claim where alleged representation that notice should be sent 
to Division of Risk Management was oral and plaintiff could not even identify 
who made the representation). 
The Tuttles also base their estoppel claim on the 1996 letter from the state 
engineer to all water users in the Pahvant Valley, stating that "all irrigated 
lands are now covered by a valid water right." R.25; Appellants' Br., 
Addendum A. This statement is a general statement about irrigation in the 
Pahvant Valley and makes no representation specifically as to any particular 
user's water rights. Therefore, it is also too general to support an estoppel 
claim. Compare Williams v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 754 P.2d 41, 53 (Utah 1988) 
(holding public service commission not estopped from concluding that it had 
no jurisdiction over one-way paging services and therefore refusing to issue 
cease and desist order against unlicensed providers, even though it had 
previously granted license to plaintiff to provide one-way paging services), 
with View Condo. Owners Ass'n, 2004 UT App. 104, f 34, 90 P.3d 1042,1051 
(remanding for further proceedings on estoppel claim to prevent construction 
of single family homes on lots 5 and 9, where town had made specific 
representations that "Lot 9" had been validly dedicated as "snow storage" for 
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condominiums); Celebrity Club, Inc. v. Utah Liquor Control Comm'n, 602 P.2d 
689, 691 (Utah 1979) (holding state liquor commission was estopped to deny 
license on ground that applicant's premises were within 600 feet of school 
when commission had given applicant letter stating that the commission has 
"reviewed the survey you submitted . . . [and] the location of the proposed 
liquor store in your proposed private club facility satisfies the 600 foot 
requirement); Eldredge v. Utah State Ret. Bd., 795 P.2d 671, 673 (Utah 1987) 
(holding state retirement board estopped from reducing benefit of retired state 
employee based on years of service that included prior years of service with 
county service, or requiring employee to purchase service credit for the county 
years, when before employee had retired, board had given employee a letter 
stating, "This letter is in regard to your years of service with Salt Lake 
County . . . . You do not need to purchase your service with Salt Lake County 
from January 1,1955 to February 15,1961. This service has already been 
posted to your account A copy of your statement [which included credit 
for the county years] is enclosed for your convenience."). 
Second, even assuming that the Tuttles could show a specific written 
representation, their allegations fail to show that their reliance on the alleged 
representations was reasonable. Again, as the trial court noted, landowners 
are presumed to know the extent of their water rights. Dugan v. Jones, 615 
P.2d at 1246. Moreover, in Utah, water rights are evidenced by certificates of 
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beneficial use issued by the Division of Water Rights after extensive 
administrative proceedings. See Utah Code Ann. § 73-3-17 (West 2004); Lake 
Shore Duck Club, 166 P. at 311 (noting that certificate of beneficial use 
provides "evidence of title, good, at least against the state, for all it purports to 
be, and good as against every one else who cannot show a superior right"). 
Those proceedings provide "the exclusive manner" in which water rights may 
be appropriated. See Mosby Irrig. Co. v. Criddle, 11 Utah 2d 41, 46, 354 P.2d 
848, 852 (1960) (citing Title 73, Chapter 3 of the Utah Code). The Tuttles 
could not reasonably mistake the groundwater survey for such proceedings or 
rely on the groundwater survey as proof that they possessed water rights not 
evidenced by certificates of beneficial use. Furthermore, the Tuttles' alleged 
reliance on the groundwater survey became all the more treasonable after 
they received the 1998 Monroe letter advising them that the Division had no 
record of a water right for the Diesel Well. R.27. 
Third, the Tuttles' allegations could not support a determination that 
manifest injustice would result if estoppel were not applied—quite the 
contrary. The Tuttles sold their farms at an inflated price allegedly because 
they believed it was worth more than it actually was. They have been required 
by the federal judgment to disgorge the excess. Aside from whether the 
Tuttles dealt with the buyers in good faith, to allow them to now profit from 
the circumstances by recovering that excess from the defendants would itself 
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be manifestly unjust. The Tuttles have lost nothing that ever belonged to 
them to begin with. They have failed to allege any reason that they should be 
allowed to keep property rights that they quickly became aware, long before 
the federal judgment was entered, were not theirs. 
Contrasting the facts here to those cases in which estoppel has been 
applied against the government is instructive. For example, in Eldredge, the 
court held that the state retirement board was estopped from removing from a 
former employee's retirement account credit for his years of service with the 
county. Before the employee had retired, the board had made specific written 
representations to him that those years would be included and in reliance on 
those representations, the employee had resigned a $ 37,000 a year position 
that he could not regain and the employee was financially unable to either 
take a reduction in benefits or purchase the years of service. 795 P.2d at 676. 
Finally, the Tuttles' allegations could not supports finding that the 
exercise of governmental powers would not be impaired by the application of 
estoppel. Water in Utah is the property of the public. See Utah Code Ann. 
§ 73-1-1 (West 2004). The Legislature has declared that "beneficial use shall 
be the basis, the measure, and the limit of all rights to the use of water in this 
state." Id. at § 73-1-3. In conducting the groundwater survey, the state 
engineer was acting in a governmental, rather than proprietary, capacity. The 
groundwater survey was intended to address a serious problem of overuse of 
-33-
water in the Pahvant Valley, including the illegal irrigation of an estimated 
8,800 acres of land. R.20. To effectively address this problem, the engineer 
needed the cooperation of the landowners not only to eliminate irrigation 
without water rights, but also to implement water metering and enforcement 
of priority rights through a commissioner-based distribution system, if those 
steps were also necessary. R.21, 22 & 26. To impose liability on the state 
engineer for his assurances that the first phase of the groundwater 
management plan—the elimination of irrigation of acreage without water 
rights—had been completed would unduly hamper the engineer's ability to 
address other similar serious problems. 
In sum, the district court correctly dismissed the Tuttles' estoppel claim. 
The Tuttles' allegations could not support a determination that defendants 
made specific written representations that the Tuttles' water rights were 
sufficient to irrigate their farms, that the Tuttles reasonably relied upon the 
representations, that manifest injustice would result if estoppel were not 
applied, or that the exercise of governmental powers would not be impaired if 
estoppel were applied. Accordingly, the judgment below should be affirmed. 
5. The Tuttles' Allegations Do Not Support a Takings Claim 
The district court also correctly dismissed the Tuttles takings claim, which 
like their other claims, relies on the fiction that the groundwater survey 
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constituted a determination of their water rights. Again, the Tuttles err.13 
Article I, section 22 of the Utah Constitution provides that "[p]rivate property 
shall not be taken or damaged for public use without just compensation." A 
takings claim under article I, section 22 has two elements: "First, the claimant 
must demonstrate some protectable interest in property. If the claimant 
possesses a protectable property interest, the claimant must then show that 
the interest has been taken or damaged by government action." View Condo. 
Owners Ass'n v. MSICO, L.L.C., 2005 UT 91, f 30,127 P.3d 697, 704-05 
(alterations and quotation omitted). A "taking" is "any substantial 
interference with private property which destroys or materially lessens its 
value, or by which the owner's right to its use and enjoyment is in any 
substantial degree abridged or destroyed." Id.u 
Although water rights constitute protectable property interests, see Sigurd 
Cityi>:15tate9^L05 Utah37S,^42P.2d 154,157il943Vthe^Tuttles fail to allege 
13Contrary to the Tuttles' assumption, the district court did not state 
that it was dismissing the takings claim because of their failure timely to file 
a notice of claim. Rather, the district court did not explain its reasons for 
dismissing the takings claim. R. 194-96; Addendum A. 
14In the proceedings below, the Tuttles also cited the takings clause 
contained in the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution. 
However, they did not contend that the Fifth Amendment provides more 
protection than article I, section 22. Therefore, defendants do not separately 
analyze the Fifth Amendment claim. See View Condo. Owners Ass'n, 2005 UT 
91, at f 29 n.5,127 P.3d at 704 n.5 (analyzing takings claim solely under 
article I, section 22 when parties did not delineate whether Utah 
Constitution provides more protection against a taking than United States 
Constitution). 
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sufficient facts from which a court could conclude that the defendants ever 
made a legal determination that the Tuttles either had, or did not have, 
sufficient water rights to irrigate all of their land. As discussed at Point 3 
above, the state engineer never made any "determination" of the Tuttles' 
water rights. His stated opinions based on the groundwater survey that all 
irrigated land in the Pahvant Valley was covered by a valid water right had 
no effect on the Tuttles', or anyone else's, certificates of beneficial use, which 
were the prima facie evidence of their water rights. It was simply a statement 
of his opinion at that time. 
Similarly, Terry Monroe's letter to the Ellsworths analyzing the water 
rights they purchased from the Tuttles, had no impact on the extent of water 
rights that the Tuttles transferred to the Ellsworths. Again, the water rights 
appurtenant to the farms were evidenced by the certificates and other official 
documents (such as change applications) themselves. Nothing the defendants 
did either before or after the Tuttles' sale of their farms to the Ellsworths 
altered the Tuttles' certificated water rights. 
The Tuttles never owned water rights sufficient to irrigate all of their farm 
acreage and neither the state engineer's letter nor Monroe's letter had any 
effect on the Tuttles' water rights, whatever they were. Therefore, the Tuttles 
did not sustain a taking and the trial court properly dismissed that claim. 
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CONCLUSION 
The Tuttles' entire complaint is built on a legal fiction: that the state 
engineer's stated opinion in March 1996 that all irrigated land in the Pahvant 
Valley was covered by valid water rights constituted a legal determination of 
the Tuttles' water rights. The trial court correctly rejected that fiction in 
dismissing the Tuttles' negligence, estoppel, and taking claims. The 
defendants owed the Tuttles no duty to use reasonable care in conducting the 
groundwater survey on which the engineer based his opinion. The Tuttles' 
allegations fail to establish that defendants ever made a specific written 
statement to them that their water rights were sufficient to irrigate their 
entire farm acreage, that the Tuttles reasonably relied on the statements that 
were made, that failure to apply estoppel against defendants would result in 
manifest injustice, or that the application of estoppel would not interfere with 
the exercise of a governmental function. The district court also correctly 
dismissed the Tuttles' taking claim because the Tuttles had no protectable 
property interest in water rights sufficient to irrigate their entire farms. 
Accordingly, the judgment below should be affirmed in its entirety. 
RESPECTFULLY submitted this 14th day of August, 2006. 
Debra J. Mowe 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorney for Appellees 
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Utah Attorney General 
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160 East 300 South, Sixth Floor 
P.O. Box 140856 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0856 
Telephone: (801) 366-0100 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
WILLIAM J. TUTTLE, CHARLENE W. 
TUTTLE J. KENTON TUTTLE and LORI ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS' 
M. TUTTLE, : MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE 
PLEADINGS 
Plaintiffs, : 
vs. : CaseNo.050913117 
JERRY D. OLDS, Utah State Engineer, : Judge John Paul Kennedy 
UTAH DEPARTMENT OF NATURAL 
RESOURCES, and TERRY MONROE : 
Defendants. : 
Defendants' Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings came before the Court on February 
27,2006, the Honorable John Paul Kennedy presiding, for decision. Having reviewed the 
pleadings, Motion, memoranda and materials submitted by the parties, and for good cause 
appearing the Court makes the following ruling. 
The Court finds that Defendants had no duty to conduct an error-free survey of 
ton 
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groundwater resources in the Pahvant Valley which mcluded property Plaintiffs owned when a 
survey was conducted in the early 1990fs. Property owners are presumed to know the amount of 
water available to their land, Dugan v. Jones, 615 P.2d 1239,1246 (Utah 1980), and may only 
alter certificated water rights through statutory procedures, Utah Code Ann. §§ 73-3-1 et seq. 
The Court also finds that Plaintiffs failed to file a notice of claim as required by the Utah 
Governmental Immunity Act within one year of when their claims arose. See Utah Code Ann. § 
63-30d-401. 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendants' Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings is 
GRANTED and Plaintiffs' complaint is DISMISSED with prejudice. 
DATED this dav of /TlfoW^ . 2006. 
BY THE COURT 
Approved as to Form 
Jack C. Helgesen 
Keith M. Backman 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
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Jack C. Helgesen 
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Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 10 
C 
West's Utah Court Rules Annotated Currentness 
State Court Rules 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure (Refs & Annos) 
*a Part III. Pleadings, Motions, and Orders 
-•RULE 10. FORM OF PLEADINGS AND OTHER PAPERS 
(a) Caption; names of parties; other necessary information. All pleadings and 
other papers filed with the court shall contain a caption setting forth the name 
of the court, the title of the action, the file number, the name of the pleading 
or other paper, and the name, if known, of the judge (and commissioner if 
applicable) to whom the case is assigned. In the complaint, the title of the 
action shall include the names of all the parties, but other pleadings and papers 
need only state the name of the first party on each side with an indication that 
there are other parties. A party whose name is not known shall be designated by 
any name and the words "whose true name is unknown." In an action in rem, unknown 
parties shall be designated as "all unknown persons who claim any interest in the 
subject matter of the action." Every pleading and other paper filed with the 
court shall also state the name, address, telephone number and bar number of any 
attorney representing the party filing the paper, which information shall appear 
in the top left-hand corner of the first page. Every pleading shall state the name 
and address of the party for whom it is filed; this information shall appear in 
the lower left-hand corner of the last page of the pleading. The plaintiff shall 
file together with the complaint a completed cover sheet substantially similar in 
form and content to the cover sheet approved by the Judicial Council. 
(b) Paragraphs; separate statements. All averments of claim or defense shall be 
made in numbered paragraphs, the contents of each of which shall be limited as far 
as practicable to a statement of a single set of circumstances; and a paragraph 
may be referred to by number in all succeeding pleadings. Each claim founded upon 
a separate transaction or occurrence and each defense other than denials shall be 
stated in a separate count or defense whenever a separation facilitates the clear 
presentation of the matters set forth. 
(c) Adoption by reference; exhibits. Statements in a pleading may be adopted by 
reference in a different part of the same pleading or in another pleading, or in 
any motion. An exhibit to a pleading is a part thereof for all purposes. 
(d) Paper quality, size, style and printing. All pleadings and other papers filed 
with the court, except printed documents or other exhibits, shall be typewritten, 
printed or photocopied in black type on good, white, unglazed paper of letter size 
(8 1/2" x 11"), with a top margin of not less than 2 inches above any typed 
material, a left-hand margin of not less than 1 inch, a right-hand margin of not 
less than one-half inch, and a bottom margin of not less than one-half inch. All 
typing or printing shall be clearly legible, shall be double-spaced, except for 
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matters customarily single-spaced or indented, and shall not be smaller than 
12-point size. Typing or printing shall appear on one side of the page only. 
(e) Signature line. Names shall be typed or printed under all signature lines, 
and all signatures shall be made in permanent black or blue ink. 
(f) Enforcement by clerk; waiver for pro se parties. The clerk of the court 
shall examine all pleadings and other papers filed with the court. If they are 
not prepared in conformity with this rule, the clerk shall accept the filing but 
may require counsel to substitute properly prepared papers for nonconforming 
papers. The clerk or the court may waive the requirements of this rule for 
parties appearing pro se. For good cause shown, the court may relieve any party 
of any requirement of this rule. 
(g) Replacing lost pleadings or papers. If an original pleading or paper filed in 
any action or proceeding is lost, the court may, upon motion, with or without 
notice, authorize a copy thereof to be filed and used in lieu of the original. 
[Amended effective January 1, 1983; April 1, 1990; April 1, 1998; November 1, 
2000; November 1, 2002.] 
ADVISORY COMMITTEE NOTE 
As a general matter, Rule 10 deals with the form of papers filed with the 
court--both "pleadings" as defined in Rule 7(a) and "other papers filed with the 
court," including motions, memoranda, discovery responses, and orders. The 
changes in the present rule were promulgated to clarify ambiguities in the prior 
rule and to address specific problems encountered by the courts. Paragraphs (b) , 
(c) and (e) of the rule were not changed, except that paragraph (e) was 
redesignated as (g) and new paragraphs (e) and (f) were added. 
Paragraph (a) . This paragraph specifies requirements for captions in every paper 
filed with the court. In addition to the other requirements, the caption must 
contain the name of the judge to whom the case is assigned, if the judge's name is 
known at the time the paper is filed. In the top left-hand corner of the first 
page, each paper must state identifying information concerning the attorney 
representing the party filing the paper. Finally, every pleading must state the 
name and current address of the party for whom it is filed; this information 
should appear on the lower left-hand corner of the last page. This information 
need not be set forth in papers other than pleadings. 
Paragraph (d) . The changes in this paragraph make it clear that papers filed with 
the court must be "typewritten, printed or photocopied in black type." The 
Advisory Committee considered suggestions from different groups that so-called 
"dot matrix" printing be specifically allowed or specifically prohibited. The 
Advisory Committee, however, settled on the requirements that "typing or printing 
shall be clearly legible ... and shall not be smaller than pica size." If typing 
or printing on papers filed with the court complies with these standards, the 
papers should not be deemed to violate the rule merely because they were prepared 
in a dot matrix printer. As currently written, this paragraph also removes any 
confusion concerning the top margin and left margin requirements (now 2 inches and 
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1 inch respectively), and this paragraph imposes new requirements for right and 
bottom margins (both one-half inch). 
Paragraph (e) . This paragraph, which is an addition to the rule, requires typed 
signature lines and signatures in permanent black or blue ink. 
Paragraph (f) . The changes in this paragraph make it clear that the clerk must 
accept all papers for filing, even though they may violate the rule, but the clerk 
may require counsel to substitute conforming for nonconforming papers. The clerk 
is given discretion to waive requirements of the rule for parties who are not 
represented by counsel; for good cause shown, the court may relieve parties of 
the obligation to comply with the rule or any part of it. 
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c 
West's Utah Court Rules Annotated Currentness 
State Court Rules 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure (Refs & Annos) 
*! Part III. Pleadings, Motions, and Orders 
-•RULE 12. DEFENSES AND OBJECTIONS 
(a) When presented. Unless otherwise provided by statute or order of the court, a 
defendant shall serve an answer within twenty days after the service of the 
summons and complaint is complete within the state and within thirty days after 
service of the summons and complaint is complete outside the state. A party served 
with a pleading stating a cross-claim shall serve an answer thereto within twenty 
days after the service. The plaintiff shall serve a reply to a counterclaim in the 
answer within twenty days after service of the answer or, if a reply is ordered by 
the court, within twenty days after service of the order, unless the order 
otherwise directs. The service of a motion under this rule alters these periods of 
time as follows, unless a different time is fixed by order of the court, but a 
motion directed to fewer than all of the claims in a pleading does not affect the 
time for responding to the remaining claims: 
(1) If the court denies the motion or postpones its disposition until the trial on 
the merits, the responsive pleading shall be served within ten days after notice 
of the court's action; 
(2) If the court grants a motion for a more definite statement, the responsive 
pleading shall be served within ten days after the service of the more definite 
statement. 
(b) How presented. Every defense, in law or fact, to claim for relief in any 
pleading, whether a claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim, shall 
be asserted in the responsive pleading thereto if one is required, except that the 
following defenses may at the option of the pleader be made by motion: (1) lack of 
jurisdiction over the subject matter, (2) lack of jurisdiction over the person, 
(3) improper venue, (4) insufficiency of process, (5) insufficiency of service of 
process, (6) failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, (7) 
failure to join an indispensable party. A motion making any of these defenses 
shall be made before pleading if a further pleading is permitted. No defense or 
objection is waived by being joined with one or more other defenses or objections 
in a responsive pleading or motion or by further pleading after the denial of such 
motion or objection. If a pleading sets forth a claim for relief to which the 
adverse party is not required to serve a responsive pleading, the adverse party 
may assert at the trial any defense in law or fact to that claim for relief. If, 
on a motion asserting the defense numbered (6) to dismiss for failure of the 
pleading to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, matters outside the 
pleading are presented to and not excluded by the court, the motion shall be 
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treated as one for summary judgment and disposed of as provided in Rule 56, and 
all parties shall be given reasonable opportunity to present all material made 
pertinent to such a motion by Rule 56. 
(c) Motion for judgment on the pleadings. After the pleadings are closed but 
within such time as not to delay the trial, any party may move for judgment on the 
pleadings. If, on a motion for judgment on the pleadings, matters outside the 
pleadings are presented to and not excluded by the court, the motion shall be 
treated as one for summary judgment and disposed of as provided in Rule 56, and 
all parties shall be given reasonable opportunity to present all material made 
pertinent to such a motion by Rule 56. 
(d) Preliminary hearings. The defenses specifically enumerated (l)-(7) in 
subdivision (b) of this rule, whether made in a pleading or by motion, and the 
motion for judgment mentioned in subdivision (c) of this rule shall be heard and 
determined before trial on application of any party, unless the court orders that 
the hearings and determination thereof be deferred until the trial. 
(e) Motion for more definite statement. If a pleading to which a responsive 
pleading is permitted is so vague or ambiguous that a party cannot reasonably be 
required to frame a responsive pleading, the party may move for a more definite 
statement before interposing a responsive pleading. The motion shall point out the 
defects complained of and the details desired. If the motion is granted and the 
order of the court is not obeyed within ten days after notice of the order or 
within such other time as the court may fix, the court may strike the pleading to 
which the motion was directed or make such order as it deems just. 
(f) Motion to strike. Upon motion made by a party before responding to a pleading 
or, if no responsive pleading is permitted by these rules, upon motion made by a 
party within twenty days after the service of the pleading, the court may order 
stricken from any pleading any insufficient defense or any redundant, immaterial, 
impertinent, or scandalous matter. 
(g) Consolidation of defenses. A party who makes a motion under this rule may join 
with it the other motions herein provided for and then available. If a party makes 
a motion under this rule and does not include therein all defenses and objections 
then available which this rule permits to be raised by motion, the party shall not 
thereafter make a motion based on any of the defenses or objections so omitted, 
except as provided in subdivision (h) of this rule. 
(h) Waiver of defenses. A party waives all defenses and objections not presented 
either by motion or by answer or reply, except (1) that the defense of failure to 
state a claim upon which relief can be granted, the defense of failure to join an 
indispensable party, and the objection of failure to state a legal defense to a 
claim may also be made by a later pleading, if one is permitted, or by motion for 
judgment on the pleadings or at the trial on the merits, and except (2) that, 
whenever it appears by suggestion of the parties or otherwise that the court lacks 
jurisdiction of the subject matter, the court shall dismiss the action. The 
objection or defense, if made at the trial, shall be disposed of as provided in 
Rule 15(b) in the light of any evidence that may have been received. 
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(i) Pleading after denial of a motion. The filing of a responsive pleading after 
the denial of any motion made pursuant to these rules shall not be deemed a waiver 
of such motion. 
(j) Security for costs of a nonresident plaintiff. When the plaintiff in an action 
resides out of this state, or is a foreign corporation, the defendant may file a 
motion to require the plaintiff to furnish security for costs and charges which 
may be awarded against such plaintiff. Upon hearing and determination by the court 
of the reasonable necessity therefor, the court shall order the plaintiff to file 
a $300.00 undertaking with sufficient sureties as security for payment of such 
costs and charges as may be awarded against such plaintiff. No security shall be 
required of any officer, instrumentality, or agency of the United States. 
(k) Effect of failure to file undertaking. If the plaintiff fails to file the 
undertaking as ordered within 30 days of the service of the order, the court 
shall, upon motion of the defendant, enter an order dismissing the action. 
[Amended effective September 4, 1985; April 1, 1990; November 1, 2000.] 
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West's Utah Court Rules Annotated Currentness 
State Court Rules 
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure (Refs & Annos) 
*! Title V. General Provisions 
-•RULE 24. BRIEFS 
(a) Brief of the appellant. The brief of the appellant shall contain under 
appropriate headings and in the order indicated: 
(a) (1) A complete list of all parties to the proceeding in the court or agency 
whose judgment or order is sought to be reviewed, except where the caption of the 
case on appeal contains the names of all such parties. The list should be set out 
on a separate page which appears immediately inside the cover. 
(a) (2) A table of contents, including the contents of the addendum, with page 
references. 
(a) (3) A table of authorities with cases alphabetically arranged and with parallel 
citations, rules, statutes and other authorities cited, with references to the 
pages of the brief where they are cited. 
(a)(4) A brief statement showing the jurisdiction of the appellate court. 
(a)(5) A statement of the issues presented for review, including for each issue: 
the standard of appellate review with supporting authority; and 
(a)(5)(A) citation to the record showing that the issue was preserved in the trial 
court; or 
(a)(5)(B) a statement of grounds for seeking review of an issue not preserved in 
the trial court. 
(a) (6) Constitutional provisions, statutes, ordinances, rules, and regulations 
whose interpretation is determinative of the appeal or of central importance to 
the appeal shall be set out verbatim with the appropriate citation. If the 
pertinent part of the provision is lengthy, the citation alone will suffice, and 
the provision shall be set forth in an addendum to the brief under paragraph (11) 
of this rule. 
(a)(7) A statement of the case. The statement shall first indicate briefly the 
nature of the case, the course of proceedings, and its disposition in the court 
below. A statement of the facts relevant to the issues presented for review shall 
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follow. All statements of fact and references to the proceedings below shall be 
supported by citations to the record in accordance with paragraph (e) of this rule. 
(a)(8) Summary of arguments. The summary of arguments, suitably paragraphed, 
shall be a succinct condensation of the arguments actually made in the body of the 
brief. It shall not be a mere repetition of the heading under which the argument 
is arranged. 
(a)(9) An argument. The argument shall contain the contentions and reasons of the 
appellant with respect to the issues presented, including the grounds for 
reviewing any issue not preserved in the trial court, with citations to the 
authorities, statutes, and parts of the record relied on. A party challenging a 
fact finding must first marshal all record evidence that supports the challenged 
finding. A party seeking to recover attorney's fees incurred on appeal shall 
state the request explicitly and set forth the legal basis for such an award. 
(a)(10) A short conclusion stating the precise relief sought. 
(a)(11) An addendum to the brief or a statement that no addendum is necessary 
under this paragraph. The addendum shall be bound as part of the brief unless 
doing so makes the brief unreasonably thick. If the addendum is bound separately, 
the addendum shall contain a table of contents. The addendum shall contain a copy 
of: 
(a)(11)(A) any constitutional provision, statute, rule, or regulation of central 
importance cited in the brief but not reproduced verbatim in the brief; 
(a)(11)(B) in cases being reviewed on certiorari, a copy of the Court of Appeals 
opinion; in all cases any court opinion of central importance to the appeal but 
not available to the court as part of a regularly published reporter service; and 
(a)(11)(C) those parts of the record on appeal that are of central importance to 
the determination of the appeal, such as the challenged instructions, findings of 
fact and conclusions of law, memorandum decision, the transcript of the court's 
oral decision, or the contract or document subject to construction. 
(b) Brief of the appellee. The brief of the appellee shall conform to the 
requirements of paragraph (a) of this rule, except that the appellee need not 
include: 
(b)(1) a statement of the issues or of the case unless the appellee is 
dissatisfied with the statement of the appellant; or 
(b)(2) an addendum, except to provide material not included in the addendum of the 
appellant. The appellee may refer to the addendum of the appellant. 
(c) Reply brief. The appellant may file a brief in reply to the brief of the 
appellee, and if the appellee has cross-appealed, the appellee may file a brief in 
reply to the response of the appellant to the issues presented by the 
cross-appeal. Reply briefs shall be limited to answering any new matter set forth 
in the opposing brief. The content of the reply brief shall conform to the 
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requirements of paragraph (a)(2), (3), (9), and (10) of this rule. No further 
briefs may be filed except with leave of the appellate court. 
(d) References in briefs to parties. Counsel will be expected in their briefs and 
oral arguments to keep to a minimum references to parties by such designations as 
"appellant" and "appellee." It promotes clarity to use the designations used in 
the lower court or in the agency proceedings, or the actual names of parties, or 
descriptive terms such as "the employee," "the injured person," "the taxpayer," 
etc. 
(e) References in briefs to the record. References shall be made to the pages of 
the original record as paginated pursuant to Rule 11(b) or to pages of any 
statement of the evidence or proceedings or agreed statement prepared pursuant to 
Rule 11(f) or 11(g). References to pages of published depositions or transcripts 
shall identify the sequential number of the cover page of each volume as marked by 
the clerk on the bottom right corner and each separately numbered page(s) referred 
to within the deposition or transcript as marked by the transcriber. References 
to exhibits shall be made to the exhibit numbers. If reference is made to evidence 
the admissibility of which is in controversy, reference shall be made to the pages 
of the record at which the evidence was identified, offered, and received or 
rejected. 
(f) Length of briefs. Except by permission of the court, principal briefs shall 
not exceed 50 pages, and reply briefs shall not exceed 25 pages, exclusive of 
pages containing the table of contents, tables of citations and any addendum 
containing statutes, rules, regulations, or portions of the record as required by 
paragraph (a) of this rule. In cases involving cross-appeals, paragraph (g) of 
this rule sets forth the length of briefs. 
(g) Briefs in cases involving cross-appeals. If a cross-appeal is filed, the 
party first filing a notice of appeal shall be deemed the appellant for the 
purposes of this rule and Rule 26, unless the parties otherwise agree or the court 
otherwise orders. The brief of the appellant shall not exceed 50 pages in length. 
The brief of the appellee/cross-appellant shall contain the issues and arguments 
involved in the cross-appeal as well as the answer to the brief of the appellant 
and shall not exceed 50 pages in length. The appellant shall then file a brief 
which contains an answer to the original issues raised by the 
appellee/cross-appellant and a reply to the appellee's response to the issues 
raised in the appellant's opening brief. The appellant's second brief shall not 
exceed 25 pages in length. The appellee/cross-appellant may then file a second 
brief, not to exceed 25 pages in length, which contains only a reply to the 
appellant's answers to the original issues raised by the 
appellee/cross-appellant's first brief. The lengths specified by this paragraph 
are exclusive of table of contents, table of authorities, and addenda. 
(h) Permission for over length brief. While such motions are disfavored, the 
court for good cause shown may upon motion permit a party to file a brief that 
exceeds the limitations of this rule. The motion shall state with specificity the 
issues to be briefed, the number of additional pages requested, and the good cause 
for granting the motion. A motion filed at least seven days before the date the 
brief is due or seeking five or fewer additional pages need not be accompanied by 
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a copy of the brief. A motion filed less than seven days before the date the 
brief is due and seeking more than 5 additional pages shall be accompanied by a 
copy of the draft brief for in camera inspection. If the motion is granted, any 
responding party is entitled to an equal number of additional pages without 
further order of the court. Whether the motion is granted or denied, the draft 
brief will be destroyed by the court. 
(i) Briefs in cases involving multiple appellants or appellees. In cases 
involving more than one appellant or appellee, including cases consolidated for 
purposes of the appeal, any number of either may join in a single brief, and any 
appellant or appellee may adopt by reference any part of the brief of another. 
Parties may similarly join in reply briefs. 
(j) Citation of supplemental authorities. When pertinent and significant 
authorities come to the attention of a party after that party's brief has been 
filed, or after oral argument but before decision, a party may promptly advise the 
clerk of the appellate court, by letter setting forth the citations. An original 
letter and nine copies shall be filed in the Supreme Court. An original letter 
and seven copies shall be filed in the Court of Appeals. There shall be a 
reference either to the page of the brief or to a point argued orally to which the 
citations pertain, but the letter shall without argument state the reasons for the 
supplemental citations. Any response shall be made within 7 days of filing and 
shall be similarly limited. 
(k) Requirements and sanctions. All briefs under this rule must be concise, 
presented with accuracy, logically arranged with proper headings and free from 
burdensome, irrelevant, immaterial or scandalous matters. Briefs which are not in 
compliance may be disregarded or stricken, on motion or sua sponte by the court, 
and the court may assess attorney fees against the offending lawyer. 
[Amended effective October 1, 1992; July 1, 1994; April 1, 1995; April 1, 1998; 
November 1, 1999; April 1, 2003; November 1, 2004; April 1, 2006.] 
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WEST'S UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 
TITLE 73. WATER AND IRRIGATION 
CHAPTER 2. STATE ENGINEER--DIVISION OF WATER RIGHTS 
§ 73-2-1. State engineer--Term--Powers and duties--Qualification for duties 
(1) There shall be a state engineer. 
(2) The state engineer shall: 
(a) be appointed by the governor with the consent of the Senate; 
(b) hold office for the term of four years and until a successor is appointed; 
and 
(c) have five years experience as a practical engineer or the theoretical 
knowledge, practical experience, and skill necessary for the position. 
(3) (a) The state engineer shall be responsible for the general administrative 
supervision of the waters of the state and the measurement, appropriation, 
apportionment, and distribution of those waters. 
(b) The state engineer shall have the power to: 
(i) make and publish rules necessary to carry out the duties of his office; 
(ii) secure the equitable apportionment and distribution of the water according 
to the respective rights of appropriators; and 
(iii) bring suit in courts of competent jurisdiction to: 
(A) enjoin the unlawful appropriation, diversion, and use of surface and 
underground water; 
(B) prevent waste, loss, or pollution of those waters; and 
(C) enable him to carry out the duties of his office. 
(c) The state engineer shall: 
(i) upon request from the board of trustees of an irrigation district under 
Title 17A, Chapter 2, Part 7, Irrigation Districts, or a local district under 
Title 17B, Chapter 2, Local Districts, that operates an irrigation water 
system, cause a water survey to be made of all lands proposed to be annexed to 
the district in order to determine and allot the maximum amount of water that 
could be beneficially used on the land, with a separate survey and allotment 
being made for each 4 0-acre or smaller tract in separate ownership; and 
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(ii) upon completion of the survey and allotment under Subsection (3)(c) (i) , 
file with the district board a return of the survey and report of the allotment. 
(4) (a) The state engineer may establish water districts and define their 
boundaries. 
(b) The water districts shall be formed in a manner that: 
(i) secures the best protection to the water claimants; and 
(ii) is the most economical for the state to supervise. 
Laws 1919, c. 67, § 7; Laws 1921, c. 69, § 1; Laws 1941, c. 96, § 1; Laws 1991, 
c. 3, § 1; Laws 2001, c. 90, § 61, eff. April 30, 2001. 
Codifications R.S. 1933, § 100-2-1; C. 1943, § 100-2-1. 
CROSS REFERENCES 
Natural Resources Act, see § 63-34-1 et seq. 
Rulemaking, Administrative Rulemaking Act, see § 63-46a-1 et seq. 
Water resource board, see § 72-10-1. 
LAW REVIEW AND JOURNAL COMMENTARIES 
Davis, The Only Way to Manage a Desert: Utah's Liability Immunity for Flood 
Control, 8 J. Energy L. & Pol'y 95 (1987). 
Engel, Water Quality Control: The Reality of Priority in Utah Groundwater 
Management, 1992 Utah L. Rev. 491 (1992). 
Freemyer and Bunnell, Legal Impediments to Interstate Water Marketing: Application 
to Utah, 9 J. Energy L. & Pol'y 237 (1989). 
LIBRARY REFERENCES 
Waters and Water Courses C=>133. 
Westlaw Key Number Search: 405kl33. 
C.J.S. Waters §§ 333 to 337, 357, 359 to 360, 362 to 364, 367, 391, 435. 
UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT 
Water rights, 
Extent of water rights, see State of Arizona v. State of California, 1936, 
56 S.Ct. 848, 298 U.S. 558, 80 L.Ed. 1331, rehearing denied 57 S.Ct. 4, 299 
U.S. 618, 81 L.Ed. 456. 
Vested rights of first to appropriate, see State of Ariz. v. State of Cal., 
U.S.Ariz.1963, 83 S.Ct. 1468, 373 U.S. 546, 10 L.Ed.2d 542, entered 84 S.Ct. 
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755, 376 U.S. 340, 11 L.Ed.2d 757, amended 86 S.Ct. 924, 383 U.S. 268, 15 
L.Ed.2d 743, amended 104 S.Ct. 1900, 466 U.S. 144, 80 L.Ed.2d 194. 
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WEST'S UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 
TITLE 73. WATER AND IRRIGATION 
CHAPTER 2. STATE ENGINEER--DIVISION OF WATER RIGHTS 
§ 73-2-15. Agreements with federal and state agencies--Investigations, surveys 
or adjudications 
The state engineer, for and on behalf of the state of Utah, with the approval of 
the executive director of natural resources and the governor, is authorized to 
enter into agreements with any federal or state agency, subdivision or institution 
for cooperation in making snow surveys and investigations of both underground and 
surface water resources of the state. The state engineer is further authorized to 
cooperate with such agencies, subdivisions and institutions, with the approval of 
the executive director and the governor, for the investigation of flood and 
erosion control and for the adjudication of water rights. The expenses of such 
investigations, surveys and adjudications shall be divided between the cooperating 
parties upon an equitable basis. 
Laws 1937, c. 130, § 2; Laws 1941, 1st Sp. Sess., c. 40, § 1; Laws 1967, c. 176, 
§ 12; Laws 1969, C. 198, § 7. 
Codifications R.S. 1933, § 100-2-15; C. 1943, § 100-2-15. 
CROSS REFERENCES 
Federal assistance management program, purposes, see § 63-4 0-1. 
U.C.A. 1953 § 73-2-15, UT ST § 73-2-15 
Current through the end of the 2004 4th Spec. Sess. 
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WEST'S UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 
TITLE 73. WATER AND IRRIGATION 
CHAPTER 2. STATE ENGINEER--DIVISION OF WATER RIGHTS 
§ 73-2-17. Authorization of cooperative investigations of groundwater resources 
The state engineer, for and on behalf of the state of Utah, with the approval of 
the executive director and the governor, is authorized and directed to enter into 
an agreement with the United States geological survey or any other federal or 
state agency, for cooperation in making investigations of the groundwater 
resources of the state and reporting thereon. 
Laws 1935, c. 106, § 1; Laws 1941, 1st Sp. Sess., c. 41, § 1; Laws 1967, c. 176, 
§ 13; Laws 1969, c. 198, § 8. 
Codifications C. 1943, § 100-2-17. 
U.C.A. 1953 § 73-2-17, UT ST § 73-2-17 
Current through the end of the 2004 4th Spec. Sess. 
® 2004 Thomson/West 
END OF DOCUMENT 
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WEST'S UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 
TITLE 73. WATER AND IRRIGATION 
CHAPTER 3. APPROPRIATION 
§ 73-3-17. Certificate of appropriation--Evidence 
Upon it being made to appear to the satisfaction of the state engineer that an 
appropriation or a permanent change of point of diversion, place or nature of use 
has been perfected in accordance with the application therefor, and that the water 
appropriated or affected by the change has been put to a beneficial use, as 
required by Section 73-3-16, he shall issue a certificate, in duplicate, setting 
forth the name and post-office address of the person by whom the water is used, 
the quantity of water in acre-feet or the flow in second-feet appropriated, the 
purpose for which the water is used, the time during which the water is to be used 
each year, the name of the stream or source of supply from which the water is 
diverted, the date of the appropriation or change, and such other matter as will 
fully and completely define the extent and conditions of actual application of the 
water to a beneficial use; provided that certificates issued on applications for 
projects constructed pursuant to Title 73, Chapter 10, Utah Code Annotated 1953, 
and for the federal projects constructed by the United States Bureau of 
Reclamation, referred to in Section 73-3-16 of said Code, need show no more than 
the facts shown in the proof. The certificate shall not extend the rights 
described in the application. Failure to file proof of appropriation or proof of 
change of the water on or before the date set therefor shall cause the application 
to lapse. One copy of such certificate shall be filed in the office of the state 
engineer and the other shall be delivered to the appropriator or to the person 
making the change who shall, within thirty days, cause the same to be recorded in 
the office of the county recorder of the county in which the water is diverted 
from the natural stream or source. The certificate so issued and filed shall be 
prima facie evidence of the owner1 s right to the use of the water in the quantity, 
for the purpose, at the place, and during the time specified therein, subject to 
prior rights. 
Laws 1919, c. 67, § 56; Laws 1937, c. 130, § 1; Laws 1953, c. 130, § 1; Laws 
1955, c. 160, § 1. 
Codifications R.S. 1933, § 100-3-17; C. 1943, § 100-3-17. 
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WEST'S UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 
TITLE 73. WATER AND IRRIGATION 
CHAPTER 5. ADMINISTRATION AND DISTRIBUTION 
§ 73-5-9. Powers of state engineer as to waste, pollution or contamination of 
waters 
To prevent waste, loss, pollution or contamination of any waters whether above or 
below the ground, the state engineer may require the repair or construction of 
head gates or other devices on ditches or canals, and the repair or installation 
of caps, valves or casings on any well or tunnel or the plugging or filling 
thereof to accomplish the purposes of this section. 
Any requirement made by the state engineer in accordance with this section shall 
be executed by and at the cost and expense of the owner, lessee or person having 
control of such diverting works affected. If within ten days after notice of such 
requirement as provided in this section, the owner, lessee or person having 
control of the water affected, has not commenced to carry out such requirement, or 
if he has commenced to comply therewith but shall not thereafter proceed 
diligently to complete the work, the state engineer may forbid the use of water 
from such source until the user thereof shall comply with such requirement. 
Failure to comply with any requirement made by the state engineer in accordance 
with the provisions of this section shall constitute a misdemeanor. Each day that 
such violation is permitted to continue shall constitute a separate offense. 
Laws 1935, c. 105, § 2. 
Codifications R.S. 1933, § 100-5-11; C. 1943, § 100-5-11. 
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WEST'S UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 
TITLE 73. WATER AND IRRIGATION 
CHAPTER 4. DETERMINATION OF WATER RIGHTS 
§ 73-4-1. By engineer on petition of users--Upon request of Department of 
Environmental Quality 
(1) Upon a verified petition to the state engineer, signed by five or more or a 
majority of water users upon any stream or water source, requesting the 
investigation of the relative rights of the various claimants to the waters of 
such stream or water source, it shall be the duty of the state engineer, if upon 
such investigation he finds the facts and conditions are such as to justify a 
determination of said rights, to file in the district court an action to determine 
the various rights. In any suit involving water rights the court may order an 
investigation and survey by the state engineer of all the water rights on the 
source or system involved. 
(2)(a) As used in this section, "executive director" means the executive director 
of the Department of Environmental Quality. 
(b) The executive director, with the concurrence of the governor, may request 
that the state engineer file in the district court an action to determine the 
various water rights in the stream, water source, or basin for an area within the 
exterior boundaries of the state for which any person or organization or the 
federal government is actively pursuing or processing a license application for a 
storage facility or transfer facility for high-level nuclear waste or greater 
than class C radioactive waste. 
(c) Upon receipt of a request made under Subsection (2) (b) , the state engineer 
shall file the action in the district court. 
(d) If a general adjudication has been filed in the state district court 
regarding the area requested pursuant to Subsection (2) (b) , the state engineer 
and the state attorney general shall join the United States as a party to the 
action. 
Laws 1919, c. 67, § 20; Laws 2001, c. 107, § 16, eff. March 15, 2001. 
Codifications R.S. 1933, § 100-4-1; C. 1943, § 100-4-1. 
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WILLIAM J. TUTTLE, CHARLENE W. 
TUTTLE, J. KENTON TUTTLE, and 
LORIE M. TUTTLE, 
Defendants. 
SPECIAL VERDICT FORM 
(J. KENTON AND LORIM. TUTTLE) 
Case No. 2:01CV907K 
MEMBERS OF THE JURY: 
Please answer the following questions according to the burdens ofproof as I have 
instructed. For those questions which require a clear and convincing burden ofproof, if you find 
the evidence in favor of the question presented is clear and convincing, answer it "yes." If you 
find the evidence in favor of the question is not clear and convincing, answer it "no." 
For those questions which require only a preponderance of the evidence, if you find the 
evidence preponderates in favor of die question presented, answer it "yes." If you find that the 
evidence preponderates against the question presented, answer it "no." If on any question you 
find that the evidence is so equally balanced that you cannot determine an answer, then answer 
the question "no." 
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We, the Jury, answer the question submitted as follows: 
QUESTIONS REGARDING FRAUD 
Question No. 1 
Do you find that Kenton Turtle was acting as an agent for Lori Tuttle for purposes of 
selling their farm? 
Yes S No 
Proceed to Question No. 2. 
Question No. 2 
(a) Have the Ellsworths proven by clear and convincing evidence that Defendant 
Kenton Tuttle committed fraud? 
Yes *S No 
If your answer to Question No. 2(a) is "yes," then go on to Question Nos. 2(b) and 
2(c)* If your answer to Question No. 2(a) is "no," then skip Question Nos. 2(b) and 2(c), 
and proceed to Question No. 3. 
(b) State the amount of compensatory damages that the Ellsworths incurred as a result 
of this fraud. 
Damages: $ V / ^ f f O . O O 
(c) State the amount of punitive damages, if any, that the Ellsworths should be 
awarded as a result of this fraud by checking the box next to A and filling in the amount If you 
find that punitive damagg& f^e-nOt appropriate, check the box next to B. 
(A) /OfwCcc punitive damages should be awarded in the following amount: 
$ /r^DOo . 
(B) punitive damages should not be awarded. 
2 
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Question No. 3 
If your answer to Question No. 1 k "ytt," then skip Question No. 3 and proceed to 
Question No. 4. If your answer to Question No. 1 is "no." then answer Question No. 3. 
(a) Have the Ellsworths proven by clear and convincing evidence that Defendant Lori 
Tuttle committed fraud? 
Yes No 
If your answer to Question No. 3(a) is "ves." then go on to Question Nos. 3(b) and 
3(c). If your answer to Question No. 3(a) is "no," then skip Question Nos. 3(b) and 3(c), 
and proceed to Question No. 4. 
(b) State the amount of compensatory damages that the Ellsworths incurred as a result 
of this fraud 
Damages: $ 
(c) State the amount of punitive damages, if any, that the Ellsworths should be 
awarded as a result of this fraud by checking the box next to A and filling in the amount If you 
find that punitive damages^re^iot appropriate, check the box next to B, 
(A) punitive damages should be awarded in the following amount: 
$ . 
(B) punitive damages should not be awarded. 
QUESTIONS REGARDING MISTAKE 
If you find liability for fraud and awarded damages for the involved property, then skip 
Question No. 4. If you did not find liability and award damages for the involved property, then 
answer Question No. 4. 
3 
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Question No. 4 
Have the Ellsworths proven by clear and convincing evidence their claim for 




(b) unilateral mistake? Yes 
(c) material misrepresentation? Yes 
J* 
Stop here. Have the jury foreperson sign and date this Special Verdict Form on the 
last page and return it to the Court 
DATED this ^0 day of Arpi^l I 
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WILLIAM J. TUTTLE, CHARLENE W. 
TUTTLE, J. KENTON TUTTLE, and 
LORIM. TUTTLE, 
Defendants. 
SPECIAL VERDICT FORM 
(WILLIAM J. AND CHARLENE W. 
TUTTLE) 
Case No. 2:01CV907K 
MEMBERS OF THE JURY: 
Please answer the following questions according to the burdens of proof as I have 
instructed. For those questions which require a clear and convincing burden of proof, if you find 
the evidence in favor of the question presented is clear and convincing, answer it "yes." If you 
find the evidence in favor of the question is not clear and convincing, answer it "no." 
For those questions which require only a preponderance of the evidence, if you find the 
evidence preponderates in favor of die question presented, answer it "yes." If you find that the 
evidence preponderates against the question presented, answer it "no." If on any question you 
find that the evidence is so equally balanced that you cannot detennine an answer, then answer 
the question "no." 
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Wc, the Jury, answer the question submitted as follows: 
QUESTIONS REGARDING FRAUD 
Question No, 1 
Do you find that Bill Tuttle was acting as an agent for Charlene Tuttle for purposes of 
selling their farm? s 
Yes v No 
Proceed to Question No. 2. 
Question No. 2 
(a) Have the Ellsworths proven by clear and convincing evidence that Defendant Bill 
Tuttle committed fraud? 
Yes _>S_ No 
If your answer to Question No. 2(a) is "yes." then go on to Question Nos. 2(b) and 
2(c). If your answer to Question No. 2(a) is "no." then skip Question Nos, 2(b) and 2(c), 
and proceed to Question No. 3. 
(b) State the amount of compensatory damages that the Ellsworths incurred as a result 
of this fraud. 
Damage: S ^ O ^ ^ i O 
(c) State the amount of punitive damages, if any, that the Ellsworths should be 
awarded as a result of this fraud by checking the box next to A and filling in the amount. If you 
find that punitive damages are not appropriate, check the box next to B. 
(A) \ punitive damages should be awarded in the following amount: 
$ I^Ot OCT? • 
(B) punitive damages should not be awarded 
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Question No. 3 
If your answer to Question No* 1 is "yes*" then skip Question No, 3 and proceed to 
Question No. 4. If your answer to Question No. 1 is "no," then answer Question No. 3. 
(a) Have the Ellsworths proven by clear and convincing evidence that Defendant 
Charlene Turtle committed fraud? 
Yes No 
If your answer to Question No. 3(a) is "yes," then go on to Question Nos. 3(b) and 
3(c). If your answer to Question No. 3(a) is "no," then skip Question Nos. 3(b) and 3(c), 
and proceed to Question No. 4. 
(b) State the amount of compensatory damages that the Ellsworths incurred as a result 
of this fraud 
Damages: $ 
(c) State the amount of punitive damages, if any, that the Ellsworths should be 
awarded as a result of this fraud by checking the box next to A and filling in the amount If you 
find that punitive damages are not appropriate, checlrthe box^nexttoB. 
(A) punitive damages should be awarded in the following amount: 
$ . 
(B) punitive damages should not be awarded. 
QUESTIONS REGARDING MISTAKE 
If you find liability for fraud and awarded damages for the involved property, then skip 
Question No. 4. If you did not find liability and award damages for the involved property, then 




« ^ : n r 
Question No. 4 
Have the Ellsworths proven by clear and convincing evidence of their claim for: 
(a) mutual mistake? Yes No < ^ ; o r 
(b) unilateral mistake? Yes No ;or 
(c) material misrepresentation? Yes No . 
Proceed to Question No. 5. 
QUESTIONS REGARDING BREACH OF WARRANTY 
Question No. 5 
(a) Have the Ellsworths proven by a preponderance of the evidence a breach of 
warranty under the Bill/Charlene Tuttle Real Estate Purchase Contract with respect to whether 
the Diesel Well was properly permitted and fit for its intended purpose? 
Yes v No 
If you answer "yes" to Question No. 5(a), proceed to Question No. 5(b). If you 
answer "no" to Question No. 5(a), skip Question No. 5(b) and proceed to Question No. 6. 
(b) State the amount of damages, including both compensatory and consequential 
damages, that the Ellsworths incurred as a result of breach of warranty. 
Damages: $ iZ^OOT^ 
Proceed to Question No. 6. 
QUESTIONS REGARDING THE JUNE 29,1999 WRITING 
Question No. 6 
Do you find that the June 29,1999 writing is an entirely new agreement, rather than a 
modification of the Bill/Charlene Real Estate Purchase Contract? 
Yes \S No 
Proceed to Question No, 7. 
4
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Question No. 7 
Have the Ellsworths proven by a preponderance of die evidence that the June 29,1999 
writing, whether a new agreement or a modification, is not a valid contract because it lacks 
consideration? 
Yes \' No 
If yon answered "yes" to Question No. 7, skip Question Nos. 8 and % and proceed to 
Question No. 10. If you answered "no" to Question No. 7, proceed to Question No. 8. 
Question No. 8 
Have the Ellsworths proven that the June 29,1999 writing, whether a new agreement or a 
modification, is not a valid contract because the parties did not have a meeting of the minds 
regarding one of its integral terms? 
Yes No 
If you answered "yes" to Question No. 8, skip Question No. 9, and proceed to 
Question No. 10. If you answered "no" to Question No. 8, proceed to Question No. 9. 
OnestioirNo^ 
Do you find that the parties intended for the term "proceeds" to mean that the additional 
7% interest would only become due if the 1999 hay crop generated a net profit (income exceeded 
expenses)? 
Yes No 
If you answered "yes" to Question No. 9, proceed to Question No. 10. If yon 




Question No. 10 
(a) Have the Ellsworths proven by a preponderance of the evidence that Bill or 
Charlene Tuttle, acting as an agent for the other, wrongfully converted funds from die 1999 farm 
operating account? 
Y e s _ \ / _ No 
If you answered Myesff to Question No. 10(a), then proceed to Question Nos. 10(b) 
and (e). If you answered "no" to Question No. 10(a), then skip Question Nos. 10(b) and (c), 
and proceed to Question Nos. 11 and 12. 
(b) State the amount of damages, including both compensatory and consequential 
damages, that the Ellsworths incurred as a result of this wrongful conversion. 
Damages: SmBqfa II,OOD 
(c) State the amount of punitive damages that the Ellsworths should be awarded as a 
result of this wrongful conversion by checking the box next to A and filling in the amount If 
you find that punitive damages are not appropriate, check the box next to B. 
(A) • punitive damages should be awarded in the following amount: 
$ . 
(B) \s^ punitive damages should not be awarded. 
OuestionNo.il 
(a) Have the Ellsworths proven by a preponderance of the evidence that Bill Tuttle 
wrongfully converted funds from the 1999 farm operating account? 
Yes No 
If you answered "yes" to Question No. 11(a), then proceed to Question Nos. 11(b) 
and (c). If you answered "no" to Question No. 11(a), then skip Question Nos. 11(b) and (c)t 
and proceed to Question No. 12. 
2211 
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(b) State the amount of damages, including both compensatory and consequential 
damages, that the Ellsworths incurred as a result of this wrongful conversion. 
Damages: $ 
(c) State the amount of punitive damages, if any, that the Ellsworths should be 
awarded as a result of this wrongfiil conversion by checking the box next to A and filling in the 
amount If you find that punitive damages are not appropriate, check die box next to B. 
(A) punitive damages should be awarded in the following amount: 
$ . 
(B) punitive damages should not be awarded. 
Question No. \l 
(a) Have the Ellsworths proven by a preponderance of the evidence that Charlene 
Turtle wrongfully converted funds from the 1999 farm operating account? 
Yes No 
If you answered "yes" to Question No. 12(a), then proceed to Question Nos. 12(b) 
and (c). If you answered "noH to Question No. 12(a), then skip Question Nos. 12(b) and (c), 
and proceed to Question No. 13. 
(b) State the amount of damages, including both compensatory and consequential 
damages, that the Ellsworths incurred as a result of this wrongful conversion. 
Damages: $ 
(c) State the amount of punitive damages, if any, that the Ellsworths should be 
awarded as a result of this wrongful conversion by checking the box next to A and filling in the 
amount. If you find that punitive damages are not appropriate, check the box next to B. 




(B) punitive damages should not be awarded. 
Question No, 13 
(a) Have the Ellsworths proven by a preponderance of the evidence that the 
Bill/Charlene Tuttle Real Estate Purchase Contract was breached by the removal of funds from 
the 1999 farm operating acc^ nftt for payment of the additional 7% interest? 
Yes y No 
If you answered "yes" to Question No. 13(a), then proceed to Question No. 13(b). If 
you answered "no" to Question No. 13(a), then skip Question No. 13(b), and proceed to 
Question No. 14. 
(b) State the amount of damages, including both compensatory and consequential 
damages, that the Ellsworths incurred as a result of breach of the real estate purchase contracts by 
removal of funds from the 1999 farm operating account for payment of the additional 7% 
interest 
Damages: $ I^ZcX? 
Proceed to Question Nort4r~ 
QUESTIONS REGARDING BREACH OF CONTRACT FOR REMOVAL OF FUNDS 
FOR PAYMENT OF INTEREST ON LOANS THAT PREDATED 1999 
Question No. 14 
(a) Have the Ellsworths proven by a preponderance of the evidence that the 
Bill/Charlene Tuttle Real Estate Purchase Contract was breached by the removal of funds from 
the 1999 farm operating account for payment of interest on loans that were incurred prior to 
1999? S 
Yes V No 
8 
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If you answered My^ff to Question No. 14(a), then proceed to Question No. 14(b). If 
you answered "no" to Question No* 14(a), stop here. Have the jury foreperson sign and 
date this Special Verdict Form on the last page and return it to the Court 
(b) State the amount of damages, including both compensatory and consequential 
damages, that the Ellsworths incurred as a result of this breach of contract by removing funds 
from the 1999 farm operating account for payment of interest on loans that were incurred by the 
Defendants) prior to 1999. 
Damages: $ fpOU 
Stop here. Have the jury foreperson sign and date this Special Verdict Form on the 
last page and return it to the Court 
DATED this ^ 1 / day of ~.WmY) . 2( 
i I     ^~il 
9 
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